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THE TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM:
PROTECTING COMPETITION
OR COMPETITORS?
JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY*
The U.S. steel industry, the third largest American industry,
has eroded steadily since 1959.' The industry attributes its prob-
lems to the presence of foreign steel on American markets.2 Its
critics, however, point to poor management, outmoded techno-
logical processes and abnormal pricing policies as the causes of
the industry's decline.'
Whatever the actual causes of the industry's erosion, both the
government and the business sector consider imports to be a sig-
*J.D. cum laude, Suffolk University, 1975; LL.M. candidate, New York Uni-
versity. Ms. Nolan-Haley is associated with Barnes, Richardson & Colburn. New
York, N.Y.
1. See generally Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Staff Re-
port on the United States Steel Industry and its International Rivals: Trends and
Factors Determining International Competitiveness (1977) [hereinafter "FTC
Study"]. See also U.S. International Trade Commission, Pub. No. 951, Conditions
of Competition in the Western U.S. Steel Market Between Certain Domestic and
Foreign Steel Products (1979) [hereinafter "USITC Study"].
2. See, e.g., J. Merrill, H. Pifer, P. Marshall & M. Breitenberg, Putnam,
Hayes & Bartlett, Inc., The Economic Implications of Foreign Steel Pricing Prac-
tices in the United States Market i, iv, 27-34 (Aug. 1978) (report prepared for
the American Iron and Steel Institute).
3. Securities Research Division, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith.
The Japanese Steel Industry: A Comparison With Its United States Counterpart
1 (June 24, 1977).
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nificant factor in the industry's malaise. The government has re-
peatedly tried to curb imports through a variety of measures,
including industry quotas, voluntary price agreements4 (VRA's)
and, most recently, the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM).5 The in-
dustry, in turn, has filed numerous antidumping complaints" to
4. For a description of VRA's, see text accompanying notes 121-132 infra.
See also FTC Study, supra note 1, at 73-81.
5. The Interagency Steel Task Force, a creature of the Carter Administra-
tion and chaired by Anthony M. Solomon, recommended the Trigger Price
Mechanism (TPM) in its Report to the President: A Comprehensive Program For
the Steel Industry (Dec. 6, 1977) [hereinafter "Solomon Report"]. The President
approved implementation of the TPM on Dec. 6, 1977. 13 Weekly Comp. of
Pres. Doc. 1835 (Dec. 6, 1977). For a discussion of the TPM, see text accompa-
nying notes 11-35 infra.
The Government has collaborated with several domestic industries in at-
tempts to cure economic ills allegedly caused by imports. In 1934, for example,
the United States established a sugar quota system to protect the domestic sugar
industry from price movements in the world market. At the same time a tariff
was imposed on most imported sugar. See Gerber, The United States Sugar Quota
Program: A Study in the Direct Congressional Control of Imports, 19 J. L. & Econ. 103
(1976).
Voluntary export controls, an alternative to import quotas in the textile in-
dustry, began in 1956 with an agreement through which Japan limited its exports
of cotton textiles. See Smith, Voluntary Export Quotas and U.S. Trade Policy-A New
Non-Tariff Barrier, 5 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 10, 13 (1973). See also text accompa-
nying notes 124-30 infra.
6. Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from Belgium, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,474
(1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from Luxembourg, 28 Fed. Reg.
6,476 (1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from West Germany, 28 Fed.
Reg. 6,606 (1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from France, 28 Fed.
Reg. 7,368 (1963). The industry was unsuccessful in these antidumping com-
plaints since the court concluded that European sales at "less than fair value" had
caused no injury to American products (see Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C.
§ 160(a) (1976)). While the Japanese rods were the "significant factor" in
harming the domestic industry, the Tariff Commission had previously found
them not to have been sold at "less than fair value" (see 19 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1976)). 28 Fed. Reg. 7,368, 7,369 (1963).
On March 21, 1980, the U.S. Steel Corporation filed a dumping petition
against 16 European steel producers; the petition involved basic steel mill prod-
ucts from seven European countries. 45 Fed. Reg. 20,150 (Mar. 27, 1980). In re-
sponse, the U.S. Department of Commerce suspended the Trigger Price Mecha-
nism on March 24, 1980, id., and stated that the underlying reasons for the TPM
no longer existed once this petition was filed and that henceforth the Depart-
ment would direct its resources to the expeditious investigation of the alleged
dumpings. Id. Despite the filing of the dumping complaint, Viscount Etienne
Davignon, Commissioner of the European Economic Community, stated that
Community steel producers did not contemplate any change in their marketing
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TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM
deter importation of foreign steel and has engaged in strong lob-
bying activities in support of protectionist legislation.7
Whether foreigri steel imports merely contribute to the steel
industry's problems or actually cause its decline is perhaps not as
important as the fact that the government acts as if imports were
the sole destructive factor in (he market and takes measures to
protect the domestic market from competition by steel imports.
Ostensibly, this protectionism conflicts with the Sherman Act,
which is based on the premise that competition produces the best
allocation of resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and
the greatest progress." Exceptions to the Sherman Act do exist,"
but the usefulness of competition depends upon limiting the
number of these exceptions; although the interaction of competi-
tive forces is not a panacea for all economic ills, it remains a neces-
sary force in a mixed economy.
Two major goals of U.S. antitrust policy are the promotion of
efficiency and progress and the maintenance of the competitive
process to limit market power.10 This Article examines the Trig-
ger Price Mechanism, considers its possible conflict with antitrust
policies, and explores the ramifications of such a conflict. Because
of the symbiosis between the Trigger Price Mechanism and the
Antidumping Act of 192 1,11 this Article discusses the TPM in con-
junction with current U.S. antidumping procedures.
I. THE TRIGGER PRICE MECHANISM
Dumping is the selling by a foreign manufacturer of goods at
below the foreign market price in the domestic market. It is es-
sentially price discrimination among nations.1 2 Under the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921, two separate bodies must make indepen-
dent determinations before a conclusion that a product has been
plans and would probably continue marketing steel in accordance with those
plans. Am. Metal MkL, Mar. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
7. See Comment, The Antidumping Act-Tariff or Antitrust Law? 74 Yale LJ.
707, 711 n.17 (1965).
8. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
9. E.g., Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976) (export trade).
10. See C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy 11-20 (1959).
11. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976). See generally Note, Effective Enforement of
U.S. Antidumping Laws: The Development and Legal Implications of Trigger Pricing. 10
Law & PoI'y Int'l Bus. 969 (1978).
12. See Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Trade 1-22 (1923).
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dumped can be reached. First, the Treasury Department must de-
termine that a product is or is likely to be sold in the United States
at less than fair value (LTFV).13 Fair value refers to the market
price of merchandise in the country of manufacture. If no foreign
market price exists, as for example, may occur when goods are
manufactured exclusively for export, the Treasury uses a cost of
production standard or the average price quoted to third coun-
tries to determine fair value. 1 4 LTFV sales, without more, are in-
sufficient to establish dumping. Second, the International Trade
Commission (ITC) must conclude that the LTFV sales are in-
juring or are likely to injure a U.S. industry.15 Once both deter-
minations have been made, the dumper is subject to a duty which
represents the difference between the U.S. importer's purchase
price and the foreign market price for the product. 6
The TPM functions as a monitoring system and as a device
for the Secretary of Treasury to initiate antidumping complaints
and to expedite the Department's antidumping investigations. 1 7
The TPM has four components: (1) the establishment of prices
for products that the American Iron and Steel Institute classifies
as steel mill products; (2) the use of a Special Summary Steel In-
voice (SSSI) for all imports of steel mill products; (3) the continu-
ous collection and analysis of data on the cost of production and
prices of steel mill products imported into the United States and
on the condition of the domestic steel industry; and (4) the expe-
dited initiation and disposition of proceedings under the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921 with respect to imports below trigger
prices. 8
Trigger prices are based on the Japanese costs of steel pro-
duction, costs that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) made available to the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment. MITI based its figures on data of the six major integrated
steel companies in Japan and some small electric-furnace steel
13. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
14. 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.1-.18 (1979).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, there must be a finding of "material" injury. The
Act does not define "material."
16. 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
17. 43 Fed. Reg. 1,464, 1,468 (1978). See Note, The Trigger Price Mechanism:
Limitation on Administrative Discretion under the Antidumping Laws, I I U. Mich. J.L.
Ref. 443 (1978).
18. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214, 65,215 (1977).
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makers.' 9 The Treasury adjusted the data MITI supplied to re-
flect production levels and capacity utilization over the average
business cycle of three years.20
A trigger price represents the aggregate of a base price, ship-
ping, insurance, interest, handling costs and appropriate extras.
Extras relate to specifications for width, thickness, chemistry and
service preparation of the base product. The Treasury Depart-
ment revises these prices quarterly to reflect changes in Japanese
costs, including adjustments for variations in labor and raw mate-
rial costs and the dollar-yen exchange rate.2 1 Ocean freight and
related costs are differentiated for each of the four major import-
ing regions in the United States-Atlantic Coast, Gulf Coast, West
Coast and Great Lakes;22 prices of specific products thus may vary
depending upon the region into which they are imported.
When imports arrive in the United States, the U.S. Customs
Service compares the prices on the SSSI's with applicable trigger
prices.2 3 The Customs Service refers any invoices showing below-
trigger prices to a Special Customs Steel Task Force, which inves-
tigates the possibility of sales at less than fair value and which may
recommend that the Treasury initiate an antidumping inves-
tigation. 24 The parameters of the Task Force's investigation are
unclear. The Treasury has stated that shipments below trigger
may result in informal inquiries with the importer to determine
whether sales have been at less than fair value. 25 However, Treas-
ury does not object to conferring with the importer before in-
stituting an investigation.
Under current antidumping procedures, thirteen to sixteen
months generally elapse from the initiation of the investigation to
the assessment of dumping duties.26 Enforcement and collection
19. 43 Fed. Reg. 1,464 (1978).
20. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214, 65,215 (1977).
21. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,180 (1979). See also 43 Fed. Reg. 1,464, 1,468 (1978).
22. 44 Fed. Reg. 24,180 (1979).
23. If the importer and the exporter are related, the first resale price by a
related importer to an unrelated U.S. buyer is used as the comparison under the
Antidumping Act. 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1976). Note, The Trigger Price Merha-
nism: Limitation on Administrative Discretion under the Antidumping Laws, I I U. Mich.
J.L. Ref. 443, 449 (1978).
24. 43 Fed. Reg. 1,464, 1,468 (1978).
25. 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214, 65,215 (1977).
26. Compare the Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12, uith Memorandum of
the General Counsel of the International Trade Commission prepared at the Re-
quest of Commissioner Bedell 22 (Nov. 28, 1977). The Solomon Report estimates
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of the duties may take years. 27 Although the Treasury has the au-
thority to initiate its own antidumping investigations,2 8 it under-
takes such investigations only when it receives a complaint that es-
tablishes a prima facie dumping case.29 Moreover, this complaint
requires a document that reports home market prices, foreign
production costs and transaction prices on shipments. Such a doc-
ument is costly, time consuming and difficult to obtain. The
TPM alleviates the need for this complaint. If Customs' analysis
of SSSI's shows substantial or repeated shipments below trigger
prices and these prices are not shown to represent fair value
within the meaning of the Antidumping Act, the Treasury will be-
gin an antidumping investigation.3"
The TPM was also intended to expedite one of the most com-
plicated aspects of an antidumping proceeding-the determina-
tion of whether LTFV sales have occurred. This requires an initial
analysis of whether the purchase price or exporter's sales price is
less than foreign market value or, if that figure is impossible to as-
certain, the constructed value. 31 Announcement of the tentative
determination is coupled with a determination of a margin of
dumping which represents the percentage of the U.S. weighted
average price by which those prices are less than the "fair value"
of the merchandise.32 The Treasury Department is permitted six
months to reach a tentative determination of LTFV sales but may
obtain an extension.33 Under the TPM, the Treasury Department
has taken less than six months to make tentative determinations of
LTFV sales.3 4
The TPM does not reduce the required time limits for final
Treasury Department determinations of LTFV sales or for the
International Trade Commission's determinations of injury. A fi-
nal determination of sales at less than fair value must occur within
the length of time as 13 months whereas the ITC Memorandum estimates tle
length of time to be 16 months.
27. Fordham Corporate Law Institute, International Antitrust Symposium
146 (1978) (remarks of Donald E. deKieffer). Mr. deKieffer notes that currently
the time lag between the entry of a duty and its collection is 3 to 3 2 years.
28. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
29. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 10, 14.
30. Id. at 10-11, 16.
31. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)(A) (1976); 19 C.F.R. §§ 153.1-.18 (1979).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 160(b)(1)-(2) (1976).
34. See text accompanying notes 36-54 infra.
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three months from the publication of the tentative determination.
During this period, interested parties may present briefs and oral
arguments to the Treasury. Following the Treasury's final deter-
mination, the International Trade Commission has three months
to decide whether the LTFV sales have injured a domestic in-
dustry.3
5
A. TPM Antidumping Investigalions
The TPM has produced four Treasury-initiated antidump-
ing investigations.3 6 Investigations of carbon steel plate imported
from Taiwan and from Poland were announced on October 25,
1978. 3 7 Within three and one-half months a tentative determina-
tion of LTFV sales in regard to the Polish steel" and a final deter-
35. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). For an analysis of the antidumping laws, see
Fisher, The Antidumping Law Of The United States: A Legal And Economic Analysis. 5
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 85 (1973).
36. One investigation was terminated at an early stage. 43 Fed. Reg. 54.315
(1978). The investigation of sales by Empresa Nacional Siderurgica, S.A. of
Spain, was terminated on the basis of a determination that, with the exception of
two shipments, all exports of carbon steel plate to the United States between
April 30 and October 31, 1978, were at or above applicable trigger prices. Cus-
toms identified two shipments that entered at below trigger prices. One shipment
entered within hours of the expiration of the Treasury Departncnts grace pe-
riod for contracts with fixed price terms. The other shipment was exported with-
in hours of the change from second-quarter to third-quarter trigger prices.
The importer's inadequate documentation and delayed or incomplete re-
sponses to the Customs Service price inquiries made it impossible for the Cus-
toms Service to verify that all shipments were at or above applicable trigger
prices. As a warning to importers, the Federal Register notice advised that in the
future, information relevant to trigger price monitoring which could have been
provided upon entry or upon initial inquiry by Customs will not be considered
once an antidumping investigation is formally initiated. Id.
For a discussion of the TPM investigations, see Note, The Initial Anlidumping
Investigations under the Trigger Price Mechanism, 13 J. Int'l L & Econ. 433 (1979).
37. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,875 (1978).
38. On February 5, 1979, a tentative determination of LTFV sales regard-
ing the carbon steel plate from Poland was published. 44 Fed. Reg. 7,005 (1979).
Since Poland is considered a state-controlled economy, its home market prices or
prices of export to third countries could not be used in determining fair value.
Id. (applying 19 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976)). Therefore, in determining whether the
steel in question was being or was likely to be sold at less than fair value. the ba-
sis of comparison was the difference between the U.S. sales prices and the home
market price of similar merchandise manufactured in Spain. Spain was chosen
because it was considered to be at a stage of economic development comparable
to that of Poland. The company involved would have preferred to have used
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mination of LTFV sales of the Taiwanese steel3 9 were announced.
Final determination of LTFV sales of the Polish steel was an-
nounced on April 20, 1979.40 The International Trade Commis-
sion's injury decisions were published on May 22, 1979 regarding
Taiwan 4 1 and June 27, 1979 regarding Poland.42 The ITC unani-
mously concluded that the imports of carbon steel plate from
Poland were unlikely to injure a U.S. industry or to prevent a
United States industry from being established. Indeed, the ITC
found that the affected U.S. industry was actually recovering
from a 1975-1976 downturn and from the injury caused by LTFV
sales from Japan in 1977.43
The carbon steel plate from Taiwan did not fare so well. An
evenly divided 44 ITC determined that the Taiwanese LTFV sales
were injuring or were likely to injure an industry in the United
States.45 One of the factors influencing the Commission's determi-
nation was the conduct of the representatives of the China Steel
Corporation, the producer of the carbon steel plate from Taiwan,
at the Commission's public hearing. The ITC found the repre-
sentatives' responses to the Commission's questions about future
pricing practices to be "evasive or noncommittal. '46 The repre-
sentatives' failure to assure the ITC that future prices would be at
fair value was taken as an indication that, without an affirmative
determination of injury, prices would remain at less than fair
value.4 7 Therefore, on June 13, 1979, the Treasury Department
issued a finding of dumping. As a result, all unappraised entries
of the steel became liable for possible assessment of special dump-
ing duties.48
Finland's prices as a basis for its home market prices. This choice was rejected.
Id.
39. On February 14, 1979, the Treasury published a determination of
LTFV sales of the carbon steel plate from Taiwan. 44 Fed. Reg. 9,639 (1979).
40. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,619 (1979).
41. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,734 (1979).
42. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,564 (1979).
43. Id.
44. The Antidumping Act provides that "the (ITC] shall be deemed to
have made an affirmative determination if the Commissioners .. .voting are
evenly divided." 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
45. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,734 (1979).
46. Id. at 29,735.
47. Id.
48. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,877 (1979).
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The Treasury announced an investigation of steel wire nails
from Korea on April 20, 1979.4 9 Of the thirty-three companies
shipping steel wire nails into the United States, twenty-two
companies were found to have shipped below applicable trigger
prices. The ITC, however, had found on February 7, 1979, that
LTFV sales of nails from Canada caused no injury to the U.S.
steel wire nail industry.50 Since the Treasury Department doubted
that LTFV sales of Korean nails would injure the U.S. industry, it
referred the case to the ITC for a determination of whether there
was a reasonable indication that the U.S. steel wire nail industry
was likely to be injured by reason of the importation from
Korea.5 1
On May 23, 1979, the ITC responded affirmatively. 52 It had
found evidence of domestic price depression, increased market
penetration and declining profits and shipments. It also found
that Korea had obtained a larger market share in the Western
States than domestic producers.53 This investigation was discon-
tinued on October 26, 1979, however, since with one exception
there was found no reasonable grounds to believe that steel wire
nails from Korea were being sold at less than fair value.54 The ex-
ception involved merchandise produced by Murakami Kogyo
Company. The margin of sales was considered minimal in relation
to the volume of exports from this manufacturer, however, and
formal assurances that future sales to the United States would not
be at less than fair value were given.55
49. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,621 (1979).
50. 1d
51. Id. This action was taken pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) (1976)
which provides:
If, in the course of making a determination ... the Secretary con-
dudes, from the information... that there is substantial doubt whether
an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, or is
prevented from being established, by reason by [sic] the importation of
such merchandise into the United States, he shall forward to the Com-
mission the reasons for such substantial doubt and a preliminary indica-
tion, based upon whatever price information is available, concerning
possible sales at less than fair value, including possible margins of
dumping and the volume of trade ....
52. 44 Fed. Reg. 29,989 (1979).
53. Id. at 29,990.
54. 44 Fed. Reg. 61,722 (1979).
55. Id
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B. TPM: Effect Upon Domestic Market Conditions
Initially, the TPM appeared to have no deterrent effect on
steel imports from the European community, while it did seem to
have a strong influence on steel products from Japan. During
1978, steel imports reached a record level of 21.1 million tons,
primarily due to European imports.56 By February 1979, the
imports had dropped 40% from the February 1978 level. 57 It is
unclear whether this decline is attributable to successful imple-
mentation of the TPM5 8 or is related to an antidumping com-
plaint that the Lukens Steel Company filed against six major Eu-
ropean countries on December 26, 1978.59
Although import statistics alone do not adequately portray
the market, 60 several observations serve to assess the impact of the
TPM and particularly its effect on the steel market in the Western
States. From January through September, 1978, the United States
experienced an 18% increase in carbon steel plate imports. Dur-
ing the same period the Western steel market experienced a 40%
increase,6 1 and the source of its steel imports shifted from Japan
to the European Economic Community (EEC) and other foreign
suppliers.6 2 For example, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and
the United Kingdom increased their share of total carbon steel
plate imports from 17% in 1976 to 45% during the first seven
months of 1978.63 During the same time, the share of imports of
carbon steel plates from Japan declined from 52% to 7%.4
It is difficult to identify a causal relationship between the
56. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979, § D, at 4, col. 1.
57. Id.
58. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,875 (1978). The International Trade Commission sug-
gested that the speed with which Treasury initiated this investigation indicates
that it "is in the nature of a triggered self-initiated investigation under the
Antidumping Act." USITC Study, supra note 1, at 39.
59. 44 Fed. Reg. 2,053 (1979). The complaint was withdrawn on June 18,
1979, subject to the following conditions: 1) that the withdrawal be without prej-
udice; 2) that the Treasury files pertaining to the petition be retained for at least
five years; and 3) that any subsequent filing with respect to the withdrawn peti-
tion be processed expeditiously. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,105, 37,106 (1979).
60. See U.S. International Trade Commission, Pub. No. 1004, Conditions of
Competition in the Western U.S. Steel Market Between Certain Domestic and
Foreign Steel Products 80 (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter "USITC Final Report"].
61. USITC Study, supra note 1, at 22, app. C at C-27).
62. Id.; USITC Final Report, supra note 60, at 84.
63. 44 Fed. Reg. 2,053 (1979).
64. Id.
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TPM and these changes in the Western steel market. The shift in
source could be related to Japan's decision (prompted by the U.S.
furor over steel imports) to limit exports to its 1977 levels.15 How-
ever, the surge of European imports could also be traced to the
fact that trigger prices are based on Japanese costs of production.
The American Iron and Steel Institute in August, 1978, released
a study that claimed that because European costs are at least fifty
dollars per net ton above Japanese costs, permitting entry of Eu-
ropean steel at trigger prices is "a license to dump.""
Members of the Western steel market have attributed in-
creased imports to the TPM's freight structure. They claim the
structure has encouraged foreign suppliers to divert to the west-
ern United States exports that otherwise would have been deliv-
ered to the East Coast.67 This diversion has apparently prompted
West Coast importers to stockpile steel products and to maintain a
discount program.6 8 However, the ITC has found that the TPM
caused no "significant diversion of imports to the Western States
from other regions. ' '69
II. THE TPM AND ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY
A. Legality of the TPM
Notwithstanding the Solomon Report's protestations that the
TPM does not constitute a minimum price system, 70 the mecha-
nism dearly operates as if it were such a system. Imports priced at
or above trigger prices enter the United States freely, subject only
to the small risk of a private antidumping action.7 1 The importa-
65. USITC Final Report, supra note 60, at 84.
66. J. Merrill, H. Pifer, P. Marshall & M. Breitenbcrg, Putnam, Hayes &
Bartlett, Inc., The Economic Implications of Foreign Steel Pricing Practices in
the United States Market 40-41 (Aug. 1978) (report prepared for the American
Iron and Steel Institute).
67. Brief on behalf of China Steel Corporation at 47, 51, Carbon Steel
Plate from Taiwan [AA 1921-197], Investigation under Section 201(a) of the
Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended, before the United States International
Trade Commission.
68. Id. at 47.
69. USITC Final Report, supra note 60, at 85.
70. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 17.
71. The Treasury Department actively encourages the withdrawal of pri-
vate antidumping complaints. See i. at 18.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politcs
19801
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
tion of steel at below trigger prices is a target for a Treasury
antidumping investigation unless the Treasury determines that
the steel is priced at fair value. The extent to which the Treasury
permits entry of steel below trigger prices but above fair value is
unclear.7 2 The fact that the Treasury Department has instituted
only four antidumping investigations pursuant to the TPM 73 indi-
cates that most imports are priced above trigger level. Addition-
ally, a large domestic manufacturer of steel, wire and wire prod-
ucts that purchases between 1 million and 1.5 million tons of wire
rod per year from foreign suppliers has claimed that the mini-
mum price scheme of the TPM deters imports at below trigger
prices, whether or not the imports are priced above fair value. 74
Moreover, the Treasury's power to revise prices, including freight
rates, gives it ultimate control over the level of imports and ability
to divert imports to selected areas of the country.
To the extent that it attempts to control competition from
imported steel mill products, the TPM thus is "in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions" within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 To
the extent that it determines or controls prices at which imported
steel mill products enter the domestic market, the TPM also is a
species of price fixing, manipulation or stabilization.7 6
The Sherman Act's proscription against restraints of trade is
limited to contracts, combinations or conspiracies. Unilateral con-
72. See USITC Study, supra note 1, at 39.
73. See text accompanying notes 36-55 supra.
74. Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1978). In
this case the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the
TPM; the plaintiff claimed that insofar as the TPM pertained to steel wire rod, it
contravened the Antidumping Act. Id. at 289. The plaintiff also claimed that tile
TPM was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and that the TPM was invalid for failure to
comply with the rule-making requirements of the APA. Id. The court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue of whether the TPM
contravened the Antidumping Act. Id. at 293. With respect to the claim that the
TPM failed to comply with the APA rule-making requirements, the court held
that the TPM was a policy statement and that its conclusion was supported by
policy considerations. Id. at 294-95. Finally, the court held that adoption of the
TPM was not arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA. Id. at
295-97.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
76. See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Ap-
palachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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duct is beyond its scope.7 Therefore, the illegality vel non of the
TPM depends upon (a) whether it results from an agreement de-
nominated a contract, combination or conspiracy and (b) whether
that agreement, if found, is in any way immunized from Section 1
liability.78
Focusing upon the first inquiry, that is, the existence of an
agreement, the attempt to select who may have agreed with whom
involves an impressive cast of characters, including the President
of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the domestic steel
industry and foreign steel producers. One combination that
comes to mind immediately is MITI's action in supplying infor-
mation on the Japanese costs of production to the Treasury De-
partment to assist the Department in its calculation of trigger
prices. This information, it should be recalled, was made available
through the cooperation of the major Japanese steel producers.79
What is less dear than the existence of a combination to com-
pute a trigger price is whether an "agreement" between the do-
mestic steel industry and the government gave rise to the Trigger
Price Mechanism. The industry's constant clamors for protection
and its persistent criticism of prevailing antidumping measures
were among the factors The Interagency Steel Task Force consid-
ered in its recommendation of the establishment of the TPM. 0
Implementation of the TPM required the cooperation of the
domestic industry in voluntarily withdrawing its pending anti-
dumping complaints and in refraining from filing further com-
plaints. The Solomon Report "encourage[d]" the industry to con-
sider the prompt withdrawal of its antidumping petitions because
the Treasury Department's resources were insufficient to adminis-
ter both the TPM and antidumping investigations."' Further-
more, the steel spokesman for the EEC suggested that if the
United States did adopt the TPM, the domestic industry should in
return drop the dumping charges it had filed against European
77. Unilateral conduct may be subject to Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, which proscribes monopolies and attempts to monopolize. See 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976).
78. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Ad: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L Rev. 655 (1962).
79. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
80. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12-13.
81. Id. at 18.
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steel producers.12 On March 1, 1978, United States Steel Corpora-
tion withdrew its complaint against six large Japanese producers
of carbon steel sheets.8 3 In July, Korf Industries dropped its
suit,s 4 as did Armco Steel Corporation in September. 5
Does this cooperation constitute an "agreement"? Proof of
parallel business behavior is insufficient to establish a Sherman
Act offense. Nonetheless, if parallelism is coupled with some kind
of interdependent decisions, an antitrust violation may exist.8s Ev-
idence which is insufficient to establish an express agreement may
suffice to establish a conspiracy.
In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States87 a group of competi-
tors responded to a demand by parties standing in a vertical rela-
tionship to them, and a conspiracy was found to exist. The Court
concluded that
[i]t was enough that, knowing that concerted action was con-
templated and invited, the distributers gave their adherence
to the scheme and participated in it.... It is elementary that
an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed without
simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspir-
ators.... Acceptance by competitors, without previous agree-
ment, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary
consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate
commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy
under the Sherman Act.8 8
If an agreement exists, insofar as it tampers with price structure,
it is condemned unequivocally because it interferes with "the free
play of market forces. '8 9 Notwithstanding this stigma of per se ille-
gality, price fixing is exempt from antitrust liability under the
Noerr-Pennington9 ° doctrine if it results from private parties' solici-
tation of administrative or legislative action. While the precise
82. Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 5, at 2, col. 1.
83. 43 Fed. Reg. 9,212 (1978).
84. 43 Fed. Reg. 30,956, 30,957 (1978).
85. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,041, 47,042 (1978).
86. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Par-
allelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 705 (1962).
87. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
88. Id. at 226-27.
89. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
90. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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contours of this doctrine are unclear, it is a relevant consideration
in any analysis of the possible illegality of the TPM.
The fact that the Executive Branch was involved in a TPM
agreement, if such an agreement exists, does not necessarily
shield the agreement from antitrust exposure. In Consumer Union
of U.S. Inc., v. Rogers,9 ' a consumer organization challenged the
President's authority to reduce steel imports through voluntary
agreements with the Japanese and European steel industries. The
group initially claimed that the steel agreements violated the
Sherman Act but then stipulated dismissal of that contention. De-
spite the dismissal, the district court concluded that the President
had no authority to exempt the voluntary agreements from the
antitrust laws. The breadth of the court's language is significant:
The President clearly has no authority to give binding assur-
ances that a particular course of conduct, even if encouraged
by his representatives, does not violate the Sherman Act or
other related congressional enactments any more than he can
grant immunity under such laws.... [Nihen representatives
of the Executive Branch venture into areas where the anti-
trust laws have apparent application, they must proceed with
strict regard for legislation outlawing restraints of trade so
that no action taken will be inconsistent with the clear re-
quirements of settled national policy.... The Court declares
that the Executive has no authority under the Constitution or
acts of Congress to exempt the Voluntary Restraint Arrange-
ments on Steel from the antitrust laws and that such arrange-
ments are not exempt.92
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia vacated the declarations regarding exemptions.93 The dec-
larations caused such concern among foreign steel producers,
however, that Congress enacted special legislation immunizing the
participants in the arrangement from antitrust liability. 4 It is
91. 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd as modified sub nom. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974). cert. denied. 421
U.S. 1004 (1975). See Comment, Executive Authority and Antitrust Consideradtions in
"Voluntary" Limits on Steel Imports, 118 U. Pa. L Rev. 105 (1969).
92. Consumer Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319. 1323
(D.D.C. 1973), aff'das modfted sub nom Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger,
506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
93. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
94. Section 2485 of title 19 provides:
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doubtful, nonetheless, that similar legislation would follow for the
TPM. The legislative history of the special voluntary agreement
legislation makes clear that it was not intended to serve as a prece-
dent.95
B. Efficiency and Progress
The steel industry is now enjoying a period of relative
prosperity-in sharp contrast to the bleakness of 1977. As of Jan-
uary, 1979, the industry was operating at 85% capacity, employ-
ment was rising, profits had risen and demand was high, with
little sign of retreat. 6 While Treasury officials credited the indus-
try's "renaissance" to the TPM a7 an industry spokesman
attributed the industry's revival to a strong demand factor. 98 An-
other spokesman credited the TPM only with eliminating "suicidal
price discounts." 99 Demand has apparently been so strong that
shortages in some products have been predicted. 00
At the same time, there has been little movement toward in-
creased efficiency or modernization in the industry. Steel plants
are still outmoded, equipment remains a "disgrace," and domestic
steel-making technology continues to be inferior to that of the
Japanese.1 01 The gap in our technology may well cause further
declines in the industry's efficiency and viability.
Voluntary limitations on exports of steel to United States
No person shall be liable for damages, penalties, or other sanctions
under the Federal Trade Commission Act or the Antitrust Acts ... or
under any similar State law, on account of his negotiating, entering
into, participating in, or implementing an arrangement providing for
the voluntary limitation on exports of steel and steel products to tile
United States, or any modification or renewal of such an arrangement,
if such arrangement or such modification or renewal--(l) was under-
taken prior to January 3, 1975, at the request of the Secretary of State
or his delegate, and (2) ceases to be effective not later than January 1,
1975.
This legislation, section 607 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2485 (1976),
was requested by the Department of State. S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
232, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7186, 7360-61.
95. Id.
96. Farnsworth, Few Like Steel Trigger Prices, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1979, § D,
at 1, col. 3.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Andrews, Maintaining Profits In Steel, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979, § D, at
2, col. 1.
100. Bus. Week, Nov. 13, 1978, at 34, 35.
101. Am. Metal Mkt., Nov. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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C. Impact on Competitive Processes
When the per se ban against price discrimination is withheld
from conduct, the purpose and effect of which is to reduce or
eliminate foreign competition, the result is inconsistent with the
antitrust policy of enhancing competition. The insulation of a do-
mestic industry from imports leads to increases in prices of prod-
ucts not subject to foreign competition.
The TPM thus supports the domestic industry's raising of its
prices.' 0 2 Since the implementation of the TPM in early 1978, the
domestic industry has obtained a series of price increases begin-
ning with a 5.5% increase shortly after the release of the Solomon
Report.' 0 3 If the steel industry follows the most recent increase by
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the industry will have raised prices
more than 6% since the beginning of the voluntary price restraint
program.1 0 4
The Federal Trade Commission estimates that the immediate
cost of minimum reference prices to consumers is $1 billion annu-
ally. 05 Price increases in steel are felt throughout the economy,
beginning with the automobile and construction industries, the
largest consumers of steel products in the United States.106 More-
over, a pyramid effect on price occurs because steel is a basic ma-
terial in the production of other products; successive purchases in
the production chain add markups above the increased costs of
the steel itself.1 0 7 To the extent that the TPM inhibits imports be-
low trigger prices, the consumer must contend with the oligo-
102. Salpukas, Februa. Steel Imports Off 40%, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979. §
D, at 4, col. 1; Brief on behalf of China Steel Corporation at 51-52. Carbon Plate
from Taiwan [AA 1921-197], Investigation under Section 201(a) of the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921, as amended, before the United States International Trade
Commission.
103. Bus. Week, Apr. 10, 1978, at 30, 31.
104. Williams, Bethlehem Lifts Steel Prices 3.5%, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28. 1979, §
D, at 1, col. 6.
105. FTC Study, supra note 1, at 559.
106. Id. at 63. According to the FTC Study, consumption percentages are
as follows: automotive industry 17%; construction indusry--16.9%; container
industry-7.5%; the balance is spread among other consumers.
107. Memorandum from F.T.C. Commissioner Mayo J. Thompson to
James T. Halverson, Director of the Bureau of Competition (May 31, 1974), re-
printed in Scanlon, We can enforce the law or help consumers: which do you want us to
do?, 7 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 47, 86 (1975). The author points out that due to
pyramiding, a $5.00 per ton rise in steel prices is equivalent to a $50.00 increase
in the cost of an automobile. Id.
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polistic pricing practices of the domestic industry.1 08
The Trigger Price Mechanism trades off the negative impact
of higher prices for the benefits of increased capacity, profits and
employment in the domestic industry.10 9 Assuming that these
gains are directly attributable to the TPM rather than to the
strong steel demand factor, they nevertheless must be balanced
against the anti-competitive effects of retaining the TPM. These
effects include the potential effect of dumping orders in TPM
antidumping cases.
The Solomon Report noted that the high margin of dumping
found in the Gilmore case (involving carbon steel plate from Ja-
pan)110 caused a "virtual halt in orders for that product from the
foreign suppliers." ' Dumping orders in trigger cases alter com-
petitive pressures even more than orders under the Antidumping
Act of 1921. TPM dumping orders raise the price for the affected
products high enough above trigger to price the imported prod-
ucts out of the U.S. market. For example, the China Steel Corpo-
ration of Taiwan, the subject of an ITC dumping finding in June,
1979,112 has stopped exporting carbon steel plate to the United
States.113 This kind of cessation permits domestic producers to
capture that share of the market formerly supplied by imports,
precisely as the Solomon Report envisaged." 4 Unless other for-
eign suppliers with sufficient capacity enter the market, regional
monopolies or oligopolies are permitted to exist. This result is an-
tithetical to the political and social goals underlying the Sherman
Act.' 15
Although the TPM is on a collision course with the Sherman
Act, abolishing the TPM now may be neither desirable nor appro-
priate to consider. The Solomon Report noted the Administra-
tion's concern that the number of antidumping complaints pend-
ing at the time of the Report threatened trade relations with our
108. Adams & Dirlam, Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power, 54 Am.
Econ. Rev. 626, 638 (1964).
109. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
110. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,489 (1977).
111. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 12-13.
112. See notes 36-48 and accompanying text supra.
113. Furst, Chao: China Steel No Threat to U.S., Am. Metal Mkt., Nov. 7,
1979, at 1, col. 1.
114. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 18-19.
115. Cf. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (horizon-
tal territorial restraints declared illegal per se under the Sherman Act).
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principal trading partners.' 6 Foreign producers charged that
strict enforcement of the Antidumping Act would have a chilling
effect on international trade relations.' 7 One of the political risks
of abolishing the TPM is the probability that domestic producers
who refrained from filing dumping complaints in exchange for
the TPM will file new charges against European producers, con-
sidered the most inefficient, and thereby exacerbate the problems
of the European, particularly the French,18 industry.
A second risk associated with ending the TPM is the possibil-
ity that it would be replaced by even more anti-competitive pro-
grams, such as quotas'1 9 or voluntary restraint agreements. 20 If
this were to occur, one economist predicts, "the departure from
competitive MC [marginal cost] pricing would become even
worse."'
121
Quotas isolate the domestic market from the world market.
They create artificial shortages in the domestic market and result
in domestic prices that are higher than world market prices.122
Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) prohibits the use of such quantitative restrictions as a
protectionist measure. 23 Therefore, an appealing substitute for
116. Solomon Report, supra note 5, at 3.
117. Wall St..J., Nov. 14, 1977, at 12, col. 2.
118. Minard, The Cross of Lorraine, Forbes, Apr. 16, 1979, at 45, 46.
119. Quotas are administered by the U.S. Customs Service and come in two
varieties: tariff rate and absolute. Tariff rate quotas permit a specified quantity
of a quota product to enter at a reduced rate of duty for a given period of time.
There is no restriction upon the amount of the product which may enter. How-
ever, any quantities that enter in excess of the quota for a given period are sub-
ject to higher duty rates. As of January 1, 1977, tariff rate quotas existed on cer-
tain cattle, whole milk, certain fish, potatoes and brooms.
Absolute quotas are quantitative-during a given quota period no more than
the amount specified is permitted entry. Examples of commodities subject to ab-
solute quota are ice cream and animal feeds.
The Federal Energy Office administers import quotas on fuel oil and the
Department of Agriculture administers import quotas on certain dairy products.
U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Exporting to the United States
65-66 (1975).
120. For discussion of the varieties of VRA's see Smith, Voluntary Export
Quotas and U.S. Trade Policy-A New Nontaiff Barrier, 5 Law & Pory In1' Bus. 10
(1973).
121. P. Samuelson, Economics 48-49 (10th ed. 1976).
122. See Gerber, The United States Sugar Quota Program: A Study in the Diect
Congressional Control of Imports, 19 J.L & Econ. 103, 103-04 (1976).
123. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, concluded Oct. 30. 1947,
art. XI, 61 Stat. A 32-34, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. 224-28 [hereinafter
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import quotas in recent years has been voluntary restraint agree-
ments; they are not considered violative of the GATT Charter.
The VRA concept was first developed during bilateral negoti-
ations between the United States and Japan in the mid- 1950's con-
cerning cotton textile imports. 124 Like the steel industry today, the
textile industry was confronted with a barrage of imports in the
1950's and, because of the industry's importance in the economy
as a major employer, clamors for protection began reaching the
Executive Branch and Congress. The 1956 agreement with Japan
was successful in reducing cotton textile imports until 1958, when
Hong Kong became the major source of import competition. This
led to the Long Term Cotton Textile Arrangement of 1962,
which offered strong protection to the cotton sector.1 2 5 However,
the Agreement failed to achieve its intended purpose of providing
a stable textile environment. Cotton textile imports decreased and
man-made textile imports increased in alarming proportions.
In 1971, under pressure from the U.S. Government-includ-
ing the threat of quota legislation-Japan, Hong Kong, China and
Korea agreed to limit on a quantitative basis the volume of non-
cotton textiles they exported to the United States. 1 26 As a result of
this agreement textiles were exempt from the 1971 10% import
surcharge. 127 The resulting loss of revenue to the U.S. Govern-
ment has been estimated to be 58.8 million dollars.1 28 The cost to
consumers from these agreements has been estimated to be be-
tween $1 billion and $2.5 billion for 1972 alone.129 Additionally,
"GATT"]. Article XII of GATT contains specific exceptions to this prohibition.
Quotas are permissible to correct a balance of payments problem or to protect a
country's internal financial position. Id. art. XII. Other provisions have been
invoked in order to restrict imports on national security grounds, id. art. XXI,
and to suspend GATT obligations on an emergency, product by product basis
for a limited period of time, e.g., when producers, as a result of unforeseen cir-
cumstances, are threatened by an imported product. Id. art. XIX.
124. Smith, Voluntary Export Quotas and U.S. Trade Policy-A New Nontariff
Barrier, 5 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 10, 13 (1973).
125. Note, United States Textile and Wheat Commitments, 1971-1972, 7 Texas
Int'l L.J. 441, 448 (1972).
126. See generally Note, United States Textile and Wheat Commitments, 1971-
1972, 7 Texas Int'l L.J. 441 (1972). For similar arrangements effected with re-
spect to steel, see text accompanying notes 91-95 supra.
127. Comptroller General of the United States, Economic and Foreign Pol-
icy Effects of Voluntary Restraint Agreements on Textiles and Steel 2 (1974).
128. Id. at 19.
129. Id.
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the U.S. Government agreed to give Korea $375 million to com-
pensate for the expected loss it would incur in limiting textile ex-
ports to the United States.130
The economic effects of the textile VRA's are similar in at
least one major respect to the TPM's, that is, increased consumer
costs. The restriction of textile imports on a quantitative rather
than value basis allowed foreign suppliers to shift their export
program to more expensive products. The resulting economic loss
fell predominately upon low income consumers.1al Increased
prices in steel, however, do not necessarily fall upon only low in-
come consumers; they are felt downstream in all sectors of the
economy.13 2
III. TPM: FAIR TRADE POLICY CHOICE?
Tension clearly exists between the U.S. antitrust policy of
enhancing competition and the Antidumping Act's preference for
protecting domestic industries from unfair foreign competition.
This situation translates into the familiar conflict between the
values of free trade, fair trade and protectionism that surfaces
whenever tariff and nontariff trade barriers shield domestic in-
dustries from import competition.
Free trade is thought to enhance productivity, increase com-
petition, restrain prices in concentrated domestic industries, en-
courage innovation and provide consumers with greater con-
sumption possibilities. It is based on the law of comparative
advantage. 33 The factors militating against free trade, pardcu-
larly within the steel industry, are full employment, supply short-
ages during recession, balance of payments and the national de-
fense.1 34
Protectionism has come into vogue of late as a cure for
chronic economic stagnation. 5 Protectionism is trade regulation
130. Id.
131. Id. at 11.
132. See text accompanying notes 102-08 supra.
133. P. Samuelson, Economics 662-65 (5th ed. 1964); FTC Study. supra
note 1, at 532, 533.
134. FTC Study, supra note I, at 534-54. The FTC Study rejects the argu-
ments against free trade except for the argument based on national defense
needs.
135. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 3.
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among countries for the benefit of home market industries.'
Tariffs are the traditional modes of protection, but import quotas
and voluntary restraint agreements often function as nontariff
protectionist trade barriers.
Somewhere on the continuum between the concepts of free
trade and protectionism is the concept of fair trade. In his first
State of the Union Message, President Carter stated that free
trade must be fair trade but he did not define the parameters of
that concept. 137 What constitutes trade "fairness" or "unfairness"
is unclear. One interpretation is that foreign competitors must be
subject to our rules of competition.13 8
The resolution of these competing policies vis-a-vis the steel
situation is complicated by the differences in industry and market-
ing techniques between the U.S. steel industry and its Japanese
and European competitors. The U.S. steel industry is an oligopoly
of large, vertically integrated firms.13 9 Most steel makers own or
control domestic ore mines and have substantial iron mine invest-
ments in Canada. 140 The Japanese steel industry is less vertically
integrated. At least 80% of the Japanese products are sold to trad-
ing companies in Japan that in turn sell to domestic and export
consumers and service centers.14' The European community,
which produces approximately one-third of the free world's raw
steel, tends to be concentrated, and this tendency is encouraged
by its respective governments.' 42
The Japanese and European steel industries enjoy certain
competitive advantages over the U.S. steel industry before their
products even reach the import market. The Japanese industry
makes economic decisions in conjunction with its government. Its
financial relationships with banks and trading companies have
permitted the development of a practice known as "rationaliza-
136. L. Yeager & D. Tuerck, Foreign Trade and U.S. Policy: The Case for
Free International Trade 3 (1976).
137. President's Address to Congress on the State of the Union, I Pub. Pa-
pers 90, 94 (Jan. 19, 1978).
138. Fordham Corporate Law Institute, International Antitrust Symposium
137-38 (1978) (remarks of Donald E. deKieffer).
139. Adams & Dirlam, Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power, 54 Am.
Econ. Rev. 626, 638 (1964).
140. FTC Study, supra note 1, at 83. See also USITC Study, supra note 1,
app. B.
141. FTC Study, supra note 1, at 19. See also USITC Study, supra note 1,
app. B.
142. FTC Study, supra note 1, at 20, 21.
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tion." This practice enables individual mills to specialize in the
production of a few product lines and thereby eliminates duplica-
tion in the industry at large. This reduces costs, increases effi-
ciency and provides a competitive advantage over nonration-
alized steel industries. 1 43
Members of the European community operate similarly but
are rationalized to a lesser degree than Japan because several
countries are involved. By coordinating their efforts, however,
these countries have protected their industry from entry by
non-EEC members. These efforts include allocating production
and raw materials among member nations and setting minimum
prices.
1 4 4
Low cost labor is another major competitive advantage of the
foreign steel industry. For example, the China Steel Corporation
of Taiwan has estimated that it required $25 in labor costs to pro-
duce one metric ton of raw steel. The cost in the United States is
$140 per ton.145 China Steel reported $94,160 in sales per em-
ployee for the fiscal year ending June 1979, with profits account-
ing for 16.4% of its sales. 146 The only U.S. company with higher
sales per employee was the National Steel Corporation.1 4 7
The foreign steel industry employs two marketing techniques
that have a significant impact on competitive conditions in the
Western steel market. These are price-indexing and channeling.
Price-indexing is a method of maintaining prices at fixed percent-
ages below the price of another producer. Price-index clauses in a
contract guarantee that importers' prices are generally a certain
percentage below U.S. producers' list prices. This makes it diffi-
cult for domestic producers to compete on the basis of price.
Many domestic producers have claimed a loss of customers to im-
porters because of price-indexing and contend that few customers
were acquired by the domestic industry's underselling competi-
tion. 1 48 However, the ITC's investigation of this practice con-
143. USITC Study, supra note 1, at 57. The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry provides the Japanese steel industry with market advice and
the steel firms generate the bulk of their financing through long-term debt. FTC
Study, supra note 1, at 20.
144. USITC Study, supra note 1, at 58.
145. Furst, Chao: China Steel No Threat to U.S., Am. Metal Mkt., Nov. 7.
1979, at 13, col. 1.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. USITC Study, supra note 1, at 59-61.
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cluded that price-indexing can be instrumental in penetrating the
market, despite the fact that importers are able to offer lower
prices than domestic competitors. 1 49 There is nothing to prevent
domestic competitors from offering additional discounts. Kaiser
Steel initiated a price discount program to meet import competi-
tion and was successful in regaining some market power.'5 0
The second practice, channeling, involves an informal alloca-
tion of customers and products by and among trading companies.
Unlike price-indexing, which is practiced by both European and
Japanese, channeling is peculiarly Japanese. If one trading com-
pany establishes an account, the other trading companies respect
that relationship without any written agreements. Even though
this practice reduces competition among trading companies, it is
thought to promote efficiency and thus permit greater cost sav-
ings to the trading firms.15 1
Theoretically, the U.S. steel companies are bound by the dis-
cipline of a market economy while their competitors are not.' 2
The laws governing competition in the United States, particularly
the Antidumping Act of 1921, are based upon a model of world
trade as a market economy with nations competing on the basis of
technology and resources. The trade decisions of U.S. trading
partners, however, are often based upon social and political con-
siderations such as full employment, production capacity or, as in
the case of Taiwan, the desire to shift economic bases. Thus, the
allocation of goods and resources is not controlled by the econom-
ics of the market place alone but by what one observer has labeled
"selective socialism. 15 3
A free trade approach would require that U.S. steel com-
panies meet competition in the market place, not in antidump-
ing proceedings or behind the trigger mechanism. An opposing
argument holds that free trade is not possible where some of the
players receive unfair advantages and that real competition exists
only when all competing players operate under the same rules.
The problem with the TPM is that it eliminates half the players
from the game.
149. Id. at 160.
150. USITC Final Report, supra note 59, at 20.
151. USITC Study, supra note 1, at 60-61.
152. Fordham Corporate Law Institute, International Antitrust Symposium
136 (1978) (remarks of Donald E. deKieffer).
153. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The International Trade Commission asserted that for most
of 1978 and probably for the indefinite future, the TPM was "the
greatest single factor influencing the conditions of competition" in
the U.S. steel industry.1 54 The precise contours of this influence
are uncertain. While it is premature to assess adequately the eco-
nomic impact of the TPM, it is possible to make some observations
vis-a-vis our national antitrust policy goals. The TPM, like the steel
VRA's of 1972, has had no discernable impact on increasing effi-
ciency through expansion, modernization or development of do-
mestic steel-making technology.
The TPM, however, does have an impact on domestic pricing
policies. By preventing foreign sellers from engaging in price
competition, the TPM functions as a constraint on the number of
foreign entrants into the U.S. market. This tends to produce anti-
competitive results, since the number of sellers in an industry usu-
ally operates as a limit on the oligopolistic control of competi-
tion.1 55
Elimination of the TPM would probably not restore competi-
tion to the steel industry. Moreover, even if steel imports were to
enter the U.S. market subject only to tariff restraints, they would
not necessarily affect the domestic industry's policies and prac-
tices, which have historically proven oblivious to confrontation
from imports.
The industry's behavior in the face of substantial imports
seemed to belie the Mancunian assumption among policy
makers that "free international trade is the best anti-
monopoly policy and the best guarantee for the maintenance
of a healthy degree of free competition."' 1
154. USITC Study, supra note 1, at 35.
155. Frederikson, Prospects of Competition From Abroad In Major Manufadur-
ing Oligopolies, 20 Antitrust Bull. 339, 368-71 (1975).
156. Adams & Dirlam, Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power. 54 Am.
Econ. Rev. 626, 628 (1964) (quoting in part from Gottfried Haberler. senior
economist at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Wash-
ington, D.C.).
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